Accountability is a dual-edged sword. Accountability can be, at times, like holding a "Condition 1" weapon (magazine inserted, round chambered) in your hand. It is to be treated with respect. To assume command is to assume the ultimate responsibility and accountability.
We've hear this rhetoric many times. So what does the concept of "accountability" actually mean?
During my formative years, I associated accountability with other words like "responsibility." It was not until early 2013 while attending the Command Leadership School in Newport that I actually was introduced to a more-refined concept: that people in positions of responsibility should understand that, at any time, they may be called upon to render accounts of events that happened in their charge. That's all accountability is at the basic level - simply answering questions regarding what happened on your watch or under your command.
That is a brilliant definition. Like many folks, I'm used to seeing the media grab some self-proclaimed "expert" and get them on the tube angrily demanding "accountability" for this official or that politician. What they really mean is they are angrily demanding punishment, often before any fair investigation can be completed.
Fortunately, America has a long-standing tradition of holding her military to a high standard. That means America expects her military to do the best job possible and to publicly answer questions regarding the abilities and competencies of the Officers appointed and charged by Congress with leading that military.
Americans give trillions of dollars to the Armed Forces to fund Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Equipment (MPT&E). In return, our leadership, at all levels, is expected to answer America when called upon. Unfortunately, we never are asked to render an account when we safety take ships to sea and safely bring them back with all hands alive and in good health. Doing our job right is often thankless and it is so because we are expected to take our ships out to sea to conduct routine and non-routine evolutions with the greatest amount of professionalism.
Unfortunately, things sometimes go wrong. I completed 11 years, 7 months, and 7 days of sea duty in my 16 (so far) years of service. I've never been in a collision (when a ship collides with another vessel) or grounding. I was once, however, on a ship that suffered an allision (when a ship collides with a fixed object, i.e., allides). This was my first ship. We completed an INSURV and were pulling into Victoria, B.C. I had the watch as Officer of the Deck earlier in the morning. Actually, I had the Deck during the Mid Watch (2330-0330). We had completed a full-power run beyond 50 nautical miles of the coast, demonstrated that our Aqueous Film-Forming Foam (AFFF) sprinklers were functional and then we headed back at maximum speed toward the Strait of Juan de Fuca. At about 0300, my enlisted watchstanders began to turn over. My oncoming helmsman happened to be one of my Boatswain's Mates 3rd Class (BM3). I had an acting Executive Officer on the bridge (our actual XO had suffered an aneurysm and was recovering). My CO was asleep. My Conning Officer (who was actually driving the ship) was a newly-reported Ensign. We were on glassy seas, with a full moon, and on a easterly course (090). We were in the Traffic Separation Scheme (much like how JSM was operating the other day - a type of "highway" on the seas), north of Port Angeles. Next course was slightly to the southeast (115). The Quartermaster of the Watch (the Navigator's representative on the watch team) marked our turn. The Conn ordered, "Right five degrees rudder, steady on course 115." The new Helmsman replied, "Left 5 degrees rudder, steady, um, uh, on course, uh, 055." We were, in fact, quickly on a collision course with a buoy! The temporary XO began to freeze and I assumed the Conn and directed my Boatswain's Mate of the Watch to take the wheel. I corrected and got us back on our leg.
Later in the day, we were pulling in and I was off watch. The ship took a Canadian Pilot onboard and he mismanaged the tugs and we subsequently smashed three pilings, costing $15,000 of damage to the pier, with our port quarter. We put a few dents in the ship but it was nothing serious. Our CO rendered his accounts. The 1-star Immediate Superior In Command (ISIC) later released a scathing report about how we screwed a routine evolution ( mooring a ship to a pier). But our CO did not get fired. He was accountable. He rendered his accounts. The Navy paid the Victoria, B.C. port authrity $15,000 to fix the pier. And that was it.
Of course, our allision was a one-time event. For the Forward-Deployed Naval Forces, it's a bit different. There have been four ship-on-ship mishaps since February in Seventh Fleet's Area of responsibility. And add two separate man overboard mishaps. This means in the span of a few months, we lost 19 Sailors in non-combat operational losses (the two MOBs, the seven on FTZ, and the 10 on JSM). That is considered a pattern. Whether it is actually a pattern or a simple sequence of unfortunate events is not a call for the majority of us to make. But understanding how people are often quick to jump to conclusions, the Navy has a responsibility to render an account to the American People on how this problem (whether perceived or actual) is addressed.
I pray no more of our ships collide, allide, ground, or lose Sailors/Marines over the side.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-navy-to-relieve-admiral-of-command-after-collisions-1503448987
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-crash-admiral-idUSKCN1B3034
We've hear this rhetoric many times. So what does the concept of "accountability" actually mean?
During my formative years, I associated accountability with other words like "responsibility." It was not until early 2013 while attending the Command Leadership School in Newport that I actually was introduced to a more-refined concept: that people in positions of responsibility should understand that, at any time, they may be called upon to render accounts of events that happened in their charge. That's all accountability is at the basic level - simply answering questions regarding what happened on your watch or under your command.
That is a brilliant definition. Like many folks, I'm used to seeing the media grab some self-proclaimed "expert" and get them on the tube angrily demanding "accountability" for this official or that politician. What they really mean is they are angrily demanding punishment, often before any fair investigation can be completed.
Fortunately, America has a long-standing tradition of holding her military to a high standard. That means America expects her military to do the best job possible and to publicly answer questions regarding the abilities and competencies of the Officers appointed and charged by Congress with leading that military.
Americans give trillions of dollars to the Armed Forces to fund Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Equipment (MPT&E). In return, our leadership, at all levels, is expected to answer America when called upon. Unfortunately, we never are asked to render an account when we safety take ships to sea and safely bring them back with all hands alive and in good health. Doing our job right is often thankless and it is so because we are expected to take our ships out to sea to conduct routine and non-routine evolutions with the greatest amount of professionalism.
Unfortunately, things sometimes go wrong. I completed 11 years, 7 months, and 7 days of sea duty in my 16 (so far) years of service. I've never been in a collision (when a ship collides with another vessel) or grounding. I was once, however, on a ship that suffered an allision (when a ship collides with a fixed object, i.e., allides). This was my first ship. We completed an INSURV and were pulling into Victoria, B.C. I had the watch as Officer of the Deck earlier in the morning. Actually, I had the Deck during the Mid Watch (2330-0330). We had completed a full-power run beyond 50 nautical miles of the coast, demonstrated that our Aqueous Film-Forming Foam (AFFF) sprinklers were functional and then we headed back at maximum speed toward the Strait of Juan de Fuca. At about 0300, my enlisted watchstanders began to turn over. My oncoming helmsman happened to be one of my Boatswain's Mates 3rd Class (BM3). I had an acting Executive Officer on the bridge (our actual XO had suffered an aneurysm and was recovering). My CO was asleep. My Conning Officer (who was actually driving the ship) was a newly-reported Ensign. We were on glassy seas, with a full moon, and on a easterly course (090). We were in the Traffic Separation Scheme (much like how JSM was operating the other day - a type of "highway" on the seas), north of Port Angeles. Next course was slightly to the southeast (115). The Quartermaster of the Watch (the Navigator's representative on the watch team) marked our turn. The Conn ordered, "Right five degrees rudder, steady on course 115." The new Helmsman replied, "Left 5 degrees rudder, steady, um, uh, on course, uh, 055." We were, in fact, quickly on a collision course with a buoy! The temporary XO began to freeze and I assumed the Conn and directed my Boatswain's Mate of the Watch to take the wheel. I corrected and got us back on our leg.
Later in the day, we were pulling in and I was off watch. The ship took a Canadian Pilot onboard and he mismanaged the tugs and we subsequently smashed three pilings, costing $15,000 of damage to the pier, with our port quarter. We put a few dents in the ship but it was nothing serious. Our CO rendered his accounts. The 1-star Immediate Superior In Command (ISIC) later released a scathing report about how we screwed a routine evolution ( mooring a ship to a pier). But our CO did not get fired. He was accountable. He rendered his accounts. The Navy paid the Victoria, B.C. port authrity $15,000 to fix the pier. And that was it.
Of course, our allision was a one-time event. For the Forward-Deployed Naval Forces, it's a bit different. There have been four ship-on-ship mishaps since February in Seventh Fleet's Area of responsibility. And add two separate man overboard mishaps. This means in the span of a few months, we lost 19 Sailors in non-combat operational losses (the two MOBs, the seven on FTZ, and the 10 on JSM). That is considered a pattern. Whether it is actually a pattern or a simple sequence of unfortunate events is not a call for the majority of us to make. But understanding how people are often quick to jump to conclusions, the Navy has a responsibility to render an account to the American People on how this problem (whether perceived or actual) is addressed.
I pray no more of our ships collide, allide, ground, or lose Sailors/Marines over the side.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-navy-to-relieve-admiral-of-command-after-collisions-1503448987
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-navy-crash-admiral-idUSKCN1B3034
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