We've been reading a hearing and discussing much about circadian watch rotations, crew fatigue, Sen McCain's admonition of the 100-hour work weeks being endured by our deployed forces, our failure to fully man/equip/maintain our ships.
I think there are even deeper issues, all of which are deeply embedded in our SWO culture. I offer we need to address the following issues:
-Empower the Junior Officer. CAPT Eyers points out in his submission to the November volume of "Proceedings" that our Junior Officers are inept at communicating with our fellow mariners via bridge-to-bridge radio. He does not explain why, however. But any SWO would probably tell you that there is a death fear of gooning up radiotelephone transmissions. If I'm a green ENS standing JOOD and the OOD or XO or CO directs me to talk to another ship via BTB, I am immediately frozen, suddenly incapable of coherent thought, and solely focused on saying EXACTLY, VERBATIM, what OOD/XO/CO are telling me to say. And when I fail to be exact, I know I will be swiftly and publicly admonished. That's only one example. We also make our Conning Officers mere parrots of the OOD, XO, and CO. I remember being near Port Angeles in a "night steaming box" as the Conn under a BMCM OOD. He was on the other end of the bridge chatting with the CO and I took initiative to maneuver to avoid a close CPA with a sailboat. The CO and OOD were, incidentally, discussing the contact picture and I was admonished by the CO. Well? Is the Conning Officer not supposed to actually drive the ship?
-Change how we evaluate and promote our officers. CAPT Junge almost touched on this point but didn't go all the way. I'm a terminal O-4 who got punished via FITREPS for practicing good officership and being an effective follower vice a mere "yes man." Senior leadership in every kind of organization will often state that they want critical thinkers who will challenge the decisions they are about to execute if it is to the detriment of the organization. But we are all people and we tend to select the people we like for promotions. That means we pick people who have similar career histories and who stoke our egos. See Carl Icahn's commencement speech to drive this point home:
Until we figure out how to reward responsible risk-taking instead of punishing it, then we will continue to see these kinds of screw-ups.
-Let's stress formality in the right places. CAPT Toti, USN (ret) expressed this sentiment in his "Proceedings" submission:
As a SWO who has stood many Bridge and CIC watches, I can attest to this. The atmosphere in the Wardroom is overly-concerned with protocol and not messing up your portion of the daily Ops/Intel brief or the next Special Evolutions brief. But go into a typical pilot house or CIC during a typical day or night at sea. Unless the CO or XO are on the Bridge, you will see the watch team jabber-jawing about sports, or home, or gossip, or anything else that has little or no relevance to the safe operation and navigation of the ship. I think we need to prioritize professionalism on watch and relaxation off watch, even at the Ops/Intel Brief. Why can't it be a discussion? Why do we assume that any question from the CO is a loaded question or an attempt to stump the chump? Probably because it happens often enough that this midset is ingrained in our SWO culture.
-Lastly, we need to properly man, train, and equip our ships. The long-standing "rip-to-fill" nonsense needs to stop. The next time we need to force-shape PO1s and Chiefs, there needs to be consideration of which Sailors on the chopping block hold critical NECs. When the 2012 ERB happened, my LHD instantly lost FOUR 1 of 1 critical NECs. And I had another 1 of 1 critical NEC ripped from my ship to fill a spot on a CVN in SLEP. Training needs to have more teeth. We have a training plan, but that usually winds up being overcome by events, then we start dealing with waivers and interim quals. Then we push the ships out for HA/DR but still have them on a deployment cycle. That means training and maintenance get diluted. So we have ships that are significantly degraded but meet minimum equipment to leave the pier. So we get these ships underway, the DHs are not fully focusing on standing watch or training because they are also still actively coordinating repairs to previously broken equipment that should have already been repaired. But we continue operating because we can't say no.
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